Northwestern Journal of International Human Rights
Volume 4 | Issue 2

Article 5

Winter 2005

Data Mining: Lessons from the Kimberley Process
for the United Nation's Development of Human
Rights Norms for Transnational Corporations
Annie Wallis

Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarlycommons.law.northwestern.edu/njihr
Recommended Citation
Annie Wallis, Data Mining: Lessons from the Kimberley Process for the United Nation's Development of Human Rights Norms for
Transnational Corporations, 4 Nw. J. Int'l Hum. Rts. 388 (2005).
http://scholarlycommons.law.northwestern.edu/njihr/vol4/iss2/5

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Northwestern University School of Law Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Northwestern Journal of International Human Rights by an authorized administrator of Northwestern University School of Law Scholarly
Commons.

Copyright 2005 by Northwestern University School of Law
Northwestern Journal of International Human Rights

Volume 4, Issue 2 (Fall 2005)

Data Mining: Lessons from the Kimberley Process
for the United Nations’ Development of Human
Rights Norms for Transnational Corporations
Ann C. Wallis*
I. INTRODUCTION
¶1

¶2

The Kimberley Process, officially in place for almost three years, is the product of
an unprecedented assemblage of national governments, non-governmental organizations
(NGOs), corporations in the diamond industry, and industry associations to establish a
certification protocol for all diamonds traded globally. The process was instituted in an
effort to stem the trade in illicit “conflict diamonds” that were being used to finance
abusive, illegal regimes in diamond-rich countries like Angola, the Congo, and Sierra
Leone. 1 Diamonds had become the currency and primary financing vehicle of rebel
movements that brutalized innocent civilians. 2 The Kimberley Process has been hailed as
a unique model because it resulted from an upwelling of action from the impacted nations
and the diamond industry after significant attention was focused on these abuses by
NGOs. The Kimberley Process was not a proclamation crafted in the halls of the United
Nations (UN) and foisted upon states and, in turn, impacted transnational corporations
without practical application or enforcement mechanisms. It was instead a movement
initiated by those state governments and companies themselves, who devised and
committed themselves to an executable protocol and monitoring procedures.
An analysis of the Kimberley Process is particularly timely because it has now been
in existence long enough that observations about its relative success, its triumphs and
pitfalls, have begun to emerge. Also, though, it can be especially instructive in another
respect – with regard to a recent undertaking by the United Nations. The UN has
expressed a renewed interest in the role and accountability of transnational corporations
in ensuring that human rights are protected in their business activities in every state in
which they operate. This focus is apparent in the UN’s April 2004 introduction and
expression of support for draft Norms on Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations

*

Ann C. Wallis is a 2006 JD Candidate at Northwestern University School of Law; BSBA in
International Business and Political Science, Washington University, 2000. This article was completed and
went into publication before the October 2005 plenary meeting of the Kimberley Process and the October
2005 annual meeting of the World Diamond Congress.
1
Significant Challenges Remain in Deterring Trade in Conflict Diamonds: Hearing on Illicit
Diamonds, Conflict and Terrorism: The Role of U.S. Agencies in Fighting the Conflict Diamond Trade
Before the Subcommittee on Oversight of Government Management, Restructuring and the District of
Columbia Committee on Government Affairs, U.S. Senate, 107th Cong. (Feb. 13, 2002) (testimony of Loren
Yager, Director, International Affairs and Trade, U.S. General Accounting Office), available at http://govtaff.senate.gov/021302yager.pdf.
2
Id.
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and Other Businesses (the Norms), 3 the subsequent report on corporate social
responsibility delivered in March 2005, 4 and the July 2005 appointment of a Special
Representative on the issue. 5 As the Norms are developed, and presumably, the
beginnings of an enforcement mechanism are discussed, the lessons from the Kimberley
Process may be particularly helpful.
In the broader context, the Kimberley Process represents one model by which “soft
law” norms are migrated to hard, enforceable law across international boundaries.
Essentially, the Kimberley approach is to convene the key global stakeholders in the
diamond trade, identify universal human rights goals for the trade and the stakeholders,
devise a process by which those goals may be achieved, and pursue uniform national
implementing legislation in each of the stakeholder states. 6 Both the UN’s past efforts
and its most recent foray into corporate responsibility for human rights have taken a
different tack, by which the UN is the primary author of the soft law norms, advised by a
representative sample of other stakeholders who have been encouraged to voluntarily
adopt the UN’s recommendations, but with no implementing or enforcement mechanisms
in place. 7 As the UN undertakes the transition from purely soft law norms to more
enforceable, international hard law, it may be well-served by better incorporating other
constituencies early and often in the process, as the Kimberley Process has done.
But mere involvement of all stakeholders will not ensure success. The direct buyin and responsibility for development of the process certainly has contributed to the rapid,
universal acceptance of the Kimberley Process’s standards and their legitimacy. Further,
the process itself, having been developed by those to whom it applies, is presumably
3

Amnesty International, Public Statement: Commission on Human Rights, 60th Session (15 March – 23
April 2004) Corporate Responsibility Breakthrough (Apr. 23, 2004),
http://web.amnesty.org/library/Index/ENGIOR410252004?open&of=ENG-393.
4
U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council [ECOSOC], Sub-Co mm’n on the Promotion and Protection of Human
Rights, Report of the United Nations High Commissioner on Human Rights on the Responsibilities of
Transnational Corporations and Related Business Enterprises with Regard to Human Rights, ¶ 1, U.N.
Doc. E/CN.4/2005/91 (Feb. 15, 2005), available at
http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/G05/110/27/PDF/G0511027.pdf?OpenElement.
5
United Nations Department of Public Information, News and Media Division, Secretary-General
Appoints John Ruggie of United States Special Representative on Issue of Human Rights, Transnational
Corporations, and Other Business Enterprises, U.N. Doc. SG/A/934 (July 28, 2005), available at
http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2005/sga934.doc.htm.
6
Telephone Interview with Ambassador J.D. Bindenagel, Vice President for Program, The Chicago
Council on Foreign Relations (Nov. 22, 2004). Prior to joining The Chicago Council on Foreign Relations
(CCFR), Ambassador Bindenagel was a US special negotiator who led the US government’s Kimberley
Process negotiating team. Ambassador Bindenagel also served as US ambassador and special envoy for
agreements on forced labor, insurance, art, property restitution, and Holocaust education and remembrance,
during which he brokered a $5 billion settlement with German-owned companies accused of various of
these offenses during the Holocaust. The approach taken to resolve these issues represents a different
international soft law-hard law transition, as the process commenced with private individuals’ lawsuits
against German companies operating in the US. Ambassador Bindenagel’s team was able to broker an
alternate remedy to the lawsuits, in the form of the $5 billion settlement, which was acceptable to plaintiffs,
defendant companies, and US courts, who then dismissed the suits. More information about this approach
is available at http://www.stiftung-evz.de.
7
See Kenneth W. Abbott, Sonya Sceats & Duncan Snidal, The Governance Triangle: States, Firms,
NGOs and Global Business Standards (forthcoming). Abbott et al create a “Governance Triangle” that
demonstrates the Kimberley Process’s nearly equal dependence on NGOs, states, and firms (the three
vertices of the triangle), while the UN Global Compact, the precursor to the Norms on the Responsibilities
of Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises with Regard to Human Rights, skews more
significantly to the state axis, with some dependence upon firms.
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practical and workable. However, some have argued that the process relies too much
upon self-policing, by both the states and the companies involved, resulting in
inadequate, “toothless” monitoring and enforcement mechanisms that are fundamentally
flawed and ultimately ineffectual. 8 As the United Nations embarks upon what will likely
be a protracted process of defining its role in governing corporate social responsibility,
these lessons of the Kimberley Process could prove invaluable. A delicate balance must
be struck between the legitimacy derived from stakeholder involvement and the need for
enforcement mechanisms independent of the stakeholders themselves.
Part II of this comment will briefly address the nature of the diamond trade and the
history that culminated in the creation of the Kimberley Process, the creation of the
process, and its structure. The instructive qualities of the process, both successful and
failed, from inception to implementation, will comprise Part III. Part IV will briefly
address the UN’s past work to promote greater corporate social responsibility with regard
to human rights, which have led to its most recent efforts. And Part V will suggest ways
in which the successes and failures of the creation of the Kimberley Process, its structure,
and its enforcement can inform the UN’s current approach to better defining and
enforcing corporate social responsibility of transnational corporations.
II. THE CONFLICT DIAMOND TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE KIMBERLEY PROCESS

¶6

The unique character of diamonds and the industry surrounding their journey from
mine to adornment renders them particularly amenable to illicit trade. 9 Diamonds are
highly valuable and easily concealed and transported. 10 They are mined in remote areas,
change hands multiple times, are intermingled with other diamonds, follow circuitous
trading routes, and are accompanied by little documentation, as the trade functions more
on honor and trust. 11 Country data on production, import, and export rates is often
fraught with error and inconsistencies. 12 All of these conditions combine to make
diamonds a very attractive currency for illegal transactions, be they arms deals, money
laundering, or various other crimes. 13
A. The Conflict Diamond Trade

¶7

The United Nations defines conflict diamonds as “diamonds that originate from
areas controlled by forces or factions opposed to legitimate and internationally
recognized governments, and are used to fund military action in opposition to those
governments, or in contravention of the decisions of the Security Council.”14 By the
1990s, the unregulated trade of diamonds had become the primary financing vehicle for
rebel groups in armed conflicts in at least three African nations – Angola, the Democratic
8
Press Release, Global Witness, A Good Watchdog But Crucially Lacking In Teeth (Nov. 29, 2001),
http://www.globalwitness.org/press_releases/display2.php?id=109.
9
Hearing, supra note 1, at 2 (testimony of Loren Yager).
10
Id.
11
Id.
12
Id.
13
Id.
14
United Nations Department of Public Information, Conflict Diamonds: Sanctions and War (Mar. 21,
2001), http://www.un.org/peace/africa/Diamond.html.

390

Vol. 4:2]

Ann C. Wallis

Republic of the Congo, and Sierra Leone. 15 And a fourth, Liberia, was also engaged in
the trade in support of the Sierra Leonean rebels. 16 In each country, the rebel groups
often controlled the diamond mining regions and used the proceeds to acquire weapons
and wage brutal, decades- long campaigns against unarmed civilians, perpetrating killings,
rapes, mutilations, and abductions into their armies or sexual slavery. 17 And while the
combined number of diamonds emanating from the illicit trade in these regions
comprised as little as 3% and no more than 15% of all diamonds on the market, the
impact on the people of these nations was immeasurably – and unacceptably – higher. 18
As many as 3.7 million people ultimately lost their lives to the diamond- financed
conflicts, and as many as 6.5 million were displaced, 19 not to mention the untold
thousands who suffered other abuses of their most fundamental rights. 20
B. Road to Reform
¶8

¶9

As early as 1993, and through 2001, the United Nations adopted various resolutions
that imposed embargoes and sanctio ns on the trade of arms and diamonds from the
nations of Angola, Sierra Leone, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo. 21
Throughout this period, the Clinton Administration took an active role in calling for these
sanctions, as well as sponsoring multilateral policy- making and diplomatic initiatives,
holding conferences and initiating dialogues about the impacted states, and encouraging
legislative change to diamond mining and marketing policies in the impacted countries. 22
Nonetheless, some members of Congress spoke out against the administration for failing
to take a more active role to stem the violence in the region. 23 The administration’s
response was that there existed no international consensus on an approach to the conflict
diamond dilemma. 24
By 2000, the efforts of the UN, the US, and other nations had still not seen
success. 25 Non-governmental organizations had begun to thrust the issue into the popular
conscience two years earlier, when they launched a constant barrage of reports and
criticism that ultimately drew the attention of diamond-producing states and companies
and the global community as a whole. 26 In 1998, Global Witness, a London-based non15

Amnesty International, The True Cost of Diamonds, THE W IRE , Dec. 2002,
http://web.amnesty.org/web/wire.nsf/December2001print/Diamonds?OpenDocument.
16
Id.
17
Amanda Bryant Banat, Note, Solving the Problem of Conflict Diamonds in Sierra Leone: Proposed
Market Theories and International Legal Requirements for Certification of Origin, 19 A RIZ. INT ’L & COMP .
LAW 939, 941 (2002).
18
Hearing, supra note 1, at 7 (testimony of Loren Yager).
19
Clean Diamond Trade Act, 19 U.S.C. §3901 (2003).
20
Amnesty International, Conflict Diamonds, http://web.amnesty.org/pages/ec-diamonds-action_2-eng
(last visited Oct. 31, 2004).
21
See United Nations, supra note 14.
22
Nicholas Cook, Diamonds and Conflict: Policy Proposals and Background, in DIAMONDS AND
CONFLICT 1, 19-20 (Arthur V. Levy ed., 2003).
23
Id. at 20-21.
24
Id.
25
Michael Fleshman, “Conflict Diamonds” Evade UN Sanctions, A FR. RECOVERY, Dec. 15, 2001, at
15, http://www.un.org/ecosocdev/geninfo/afrec/vol15no4/154diam.htm.
26
INGRID J. TAMM, DIAMONDS IN PEACE AND W AR: SEVERING THE CONFLICT -DIAMOND CONNECTION at
22 (World Peace Found. Reports No. 30, 2002).
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governmental organization that focused upon the linkage between the exploitation of
natural resources and human rights, released a report titled A Rough Trade: The Role of
Companies and Governments in the Angolan Conflict.27 Among other allegations, the
report implicated De Beers in buying diamonds from Angolan rebel groups in order to
maintain market stability. 28 De Beers is the acknowledged juggernaut of the diamond
industry – selling 85% to 90% of all diamonds worldwide throughout most of the
twentieth century. 29 The NGO activity spurred others to act as well. In 1999, US
Congressman Tony Hall introduced a bill into Congress (the Consumer Access to
Responsible Accounting of Trade, or CARAT Act) requiring that every diamond valued
at greater than $100 that entered the United States be accompanied by a certificate of
origin. 30 The bill was unsuccessful. 31
¶10
The NGO drumbeat persisted. In October 1999, four European human rights
organizations launched a campaign titled the “Fatal Transactions Campaign,” again
highlighting conflict diamond sales in Angola, and in Sierra Leone and Liberia as well. 32
The group called again for the diamond industry, particularly De Beers, to take a more
significant role in curbing this trade. 33 Within days of the report’s release, De Beers first
announced that it had placed an embargo on all diamond purchases from Angola, and
then that it was ceasing diamond purchases from the outside market altogether. 34 Shortly
thereafter, in January 2000, Partnership Africa Canada, another active NGO advocating
appropriate extraction and use of natural resources in Africa, released a report titled The
Heart of the Matter: Sierra Leone, Diamonds and Human Security. 35
¶11
In March 2000, the NGOs’ assertions were corroborated by a UN Security Council
report on the status of UN sanctions against the Angolan rebel group UNITA. 36
Commonly called the Fowler Report for then-Canadian Ambassador to the UN Robert R.
Fowler, who chaired the sanctions committee, the Report of the Panel of Experts on
Violations of Security Council Sanctions Against UNITA clearly illustrated the connection
between the illicit diamond trade and the conflict in Angola, 37 legitimizing and expanding
the concerns that had been instigated by the NGOs. 38 The Fowler Report is widely
regarded as the seminal UN document that confirmed the NGOs’ claims and focused the
UN’s, and indeed, the world ’s, attention on the conflict-diamond connection.

27
28
29

Id.
Id. at 22-23.
Nicholas Stein, The De Beers Story: A New Cut on an Old Monopoly, FORTUNE, Feb. 19, 2001, at

186.
30

Daniel L. Feldman, Conflict Diamonds, International Trade Regulation, and the Nature of Law, 24 U.
PA. INT ’L BUS. L. 835, 845-46 (2003).
31
Id.
32
TAMM, supra note 26, at 23.
33
Id.
34
Id.
35
Id.
36
Chairman of the Security Council Committee Established Pursuant to Resolution 864 (1993)
Concerning the Situation in Angola, Letter Dated 10 March 2000 from the Chairman of the Security
Council Committee Established Pursuant to Resolution 864 (1993) Concerning the Situation in Angola
Addressed to the President of the Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/2000/203 (2000), available at
http://odslogin-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N00/335/64/img/N0033564.pdf?OpenElement.
37
Id.
38
Cook, supra note 22, at 5.
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In the early summer of 2000, Amnesty International and World Vision organized a
small protest including Congressman Tony Hall outside Cartier’s Fifth Avenue store in
New York. 39 Congressman Hall revamped and reintroduced his CARAT Act in
September of that year, to no avail. 40 In October, he introduced a new bill titled the
Conflict Diamonds Elimination Act, a compromise bill between the diamond industry
and NGOs. 41 Again, the bill did not pass, but Hall’s persistence kept the issue active and
on the agenda. 42 As pressures mounted from all sides and the prospect of a potentially
crippling consumer backlash and boycott became more real, companies engaged in the
diamond trade and industry associations quickly took notice. 43
C. Negotiating the Kimberley Process

¶13

The opportunity was ripe for a unique assemblage of international players to come
together in hopes of halting the illegal trade of conflict diamonds - the exasperated
diamond-producing African nations, looking to quell the decades of violence and salvage
the diamond trade; companies engaged in the diamond trade and the industry associations
who represented them, fearing an NGO-driven boycott and the potential collapse of the
industry; and over 70 NGOs, who had themselves originally focused public attention on
the matter. 44
¶14
In May 2000, African diamond-producing nations came together in Kimberley,
South Africa to attempt to devise a remedy. 45 In July, at the 29th World Diamond
Congress, the International Diamond Manufacturers’ Association and the World
Federation of Diamond Bourses issued a joint, “zero tolerance” resolution on conflict
diamonds, by which they created the World Diamond Council to represent the interests of
all aspects of the diamond industry in the work to eliminate conflict diamonds. 46 By
December 2000, the United Nations General Assembly had adopted General Assembly
Resolution 55/56, requesting the development of an international certification scheme for
rough diamonds. 47 Forty-eight states sponsored the resolution, and it was unanimously
adopted without a vote. 48 This resolution imposed a timeline on the process, with the UN
requesting a report by December 2001. 49 It also signaled the involvement of more
national governments. 50

39

Feldman, supra note 30, at 848.
Tracey Michelle Price, The Kimberley Process: Conflict Diamonds, WTO Obligations, and the
Universality Debate, 12 M INN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 1, 44 (2003).
41
Id at 45.
42
Id. at 44-45.
43
Id. at 32-33.
44
Id.
45
Hearing, supra note 1, at 5 (testimony of Loren Yager).
46
W ORLD DIAMOND COUNCIL, THE ESSENTIAL GUIDE TO IMPLEMENTING THE KIMBERLEY PROCESS 1112 (2003), http://www.worlddiamondcouncil.com/wdcbk.pdf.
47
TAMM, supra note 26, at 18.
48
Id. at 19. Press Release, General Assembly, General Assembly Urges Finalization of International
Certification Scheme for Rough Diamonds, U.N. Doc. GA/10011 (Mar. 13, 2002), available at
http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2002/GA10011.doc.htm.
49
TAMM, supra note 26, at 19.
50
Id.
40
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In February 2001, the expanded group of Kimberley Process participants, now
including diamond importing and processing nations and the World Diamond Council in
addition to diamond producers, met in Namibia to establish the Kimberley Process Task
Force and lay out a roadmap for meeting the December 2001 reporting deadline. 51 The
group was also in constant consultation with NGOs,52 who continued to apply consistent
pressure on the process. In fact, that same month, a coalition of seven NGOs issued a
report card on the Kimberley Process, effectively giving them an “A” for effort, but an
“F” for effectiveness in their ability to meet the UN’s call for a workable and transparent
process. 53
At the same time, the US was still actively engaged in the issue. One of the last
acts of the Clinton Administration on conflict diamonds was the White House Diamonds
Conference, titled Technologies for Identification and Certification, hosted by the White
House Office of Science and Technology Assessment on January 10, 2001. 54 Over 150
engineers, scientists, policy makers, and representatives of NGOs and the global diamond
industry discussed the technical identification methods for determining the origin of
rough diamonds, the feasibility of an origin certification program, and related policy
concerns. 55 When the Bush Administration came into power, it essentially adopted many
of the same tactics that had been in force under Clinton. Over the two presidents’ terms,
executive orders were issued to implement UN sanctions banning importation of
diamonds from Angola, Sierra Leone, and Liberia. 56
Legislators continued to attempt to enact legislation restricting the conflict diamond
trade with the US. In the fall of 2001, two distinct bills were put forth in the House and
Senate, each of which was called the Clean Diamond Trade Act, and each of which
attempted to make improvements to prior bills. 57
But the conflict diamond issue took on even greater importance when on November
2, 2001, less than two months after the September 11th attacks, the Washington Post
broke a story connecting financing of Al Qaeda with conflict diamonds. 58 Shortly
thereafter, on November 28, the House passed the most recent version of the bill. 59 But
the Senate did not do so before the November recess. 60
Following the initial meeting in February 2001, five subsequent meetings of the
Kimberley Process were held in international capitals. 61 At the conclusion of the final
meeting before the original UN reporting deadline, on November 29, 2001 in Gabarone,
Botswana, representatives released a working document detailing a series of guidelines
51

Kimberley Process Meeting and Technical Workshop, Windhoek, Namibia, 13-16 February 2001,
Final Communiqué (2001),
http://www.kimberleyprocess.com:8080/site/www_docs/plenary_meetings19/9windhoek_final_communiq
ue.pdf.
52
Id.
53
Price, supra note 40, at 35.
54
The conference was sponsored in concert with the National Security Council, the State Department,
the National Science Foundation, and the Treasury Department. Cook, supra note 22, at 5.
55
Id.
56
Price, supra note 40, at 43.
57
Id. at 45-46.
58
DOUGLAS FARAH, BLOOD FROM STONES, 59-60 (2004).
59
Price, supra note 40, at 46.
60
Id. at 47.
61
TAMM, supra note 26, at 20-21.
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by which each participating state would be governed. 62 The report designated the end of
2002 as the deadline by which the certification process would be fully implemented,
encouraging those who could do so immediately to begin issuing certificates, and all
others to do so no later than June 2002. 63 Ultimately, however, the report was not
introduced and discussed at the UN General Assembly until March 2002. 64 During the
intervening period, many who found fault with the guidelines and questioned their
potential effectiveness spoke out. 65 Among them was the Director of International
Affairs and Trade of the General Accounting Office, who gave testimony before a Senate
subcommittee in February 2002 entitled “Significant Challenges Remain in Deterring
Trade in Conflict Diamonds”. 66 Nonetheless, on March 13, 2002 the United Nations
General Assembly, after reviewing the November 2001 working document of the
Kimberley Process, passed Resolution 56/263 expressing support for it. 67 Five days later,
on March 18, concerned that the bill passed by the House was significantly weakened,
Senators Durbin, Feingold and DeWine introduced yet another version of the Clean
Diamond Trade Act. Ultimately, however, it did not pass either. 68
¶20
That summer, the US asked Ambassador JD Bindenagel to step in and “close the
deal,” effectively to help accelerate the ratification and implementation of the Kimberley
Process after its long and rocky period of false starts. 69 Finally, in November 2002 the
Kimberley Process assembled again and actually ratified the Kimberley Process
Certification Scheme (KPCS).70 Fifty-two nations ratified and adopted the protocol, 71
with an anticipated compliance date of January 2003. 72 On January 28, 2003, the UN
Security Council issued a resolution ratifying the Certification Scheme. 73 But at the April
2003 plenary meeting, the deadline for meeting membership requirements was extended
again until July of that year. 74 Finally, it was decided that those not qualifying by August
31, 2003 would be banned from trading in rough diamonds until they put appropriate
enacting legislation in place. 75
¶21
In response to the final adoption of the Kimberley Process, the US again attempted
to pass implementing legislation. 76 Given the prior barriers to passage, the Bush
Administration felt it would be most effective in the short-run to pursue an executive

62

Id.
Id.
64
Margo Kaplan, Note, Carats and Sticks: Pursuing War and Peace Through the Diamond Trade, 35
N.Y.U. J. INT ’L L. & POL. 559, 588 (2003).
65
Price, supra note 40, at 35.
66
Hearing, supra note 1 (testimony of Loren Yager).
67
Kaplan, supra note 64, at 589.
68
Price, supra note 40, at 47.
69
Bindenagel, supra note 6.
70
W ORLD DIAMOND COUNCIL, supra note 46, at 1.
71
Id.
72
Kaplan, supra note 64, at 589.
73
S.C. Res. 1459, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1459(2003) (Jan. 28, 2003), available at http://ods-ddsny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N03/227/58/PDF/N0322758.pdf?OpenElement.
74
Kaplan, supra note 64, at 589.
75
Kimberley Process Chair’s Notice: End of Tolerance Period in the Kimberley Process (July 31, 2003),
http://www.kimberleyprocess.com:8080/site/www_docs/chairs6/chair%27s_notice-_31_july_2003__end_of_tolerance_period.pdf.
76
Bindenagel, supra note 6.
63
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order ratifying and adopting the Kimberley Process, and did so on January 1, 2003. 77
Ultimately, implementing legislation, titled the Clean Diamond Trade Act, was passed
unanimously in the House and Senate, and signed into law by President Bush on April
25, 2003.78 On May 15, 2003, the World Trade Organization granted a waiver to 11
member states excusing them from violations of certain articles of the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) with respect to measures necessary to “prohibit
the import [or export] of rough diamonds to [or from] non-participants in the Kimberley
Process Certification Scheme consistent with the Kimberley Process Certification
Scheme.”79 The waiver was made retroactive to January 1, 2003, and lasts until
December 31, 2006. 80
D. The Kimberley Process
¶22

At the most basic level, the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme requires that
all shipments of rough diamonds being either exported internationally from their source,
or re-exported internationally, must be transported in a tamper-resistant container and
accompanied by a Kimberley Process Certificate validated by the government. 81 That
shipment can only be exported to another participating country in the process, and no
uncertified shipments will be permitted into participating countries. 82
¶23
After the point of export of the rough diamonds, however, diamonds are only
subject to the voluntary System of Warranties originally devised by the World Diamond
Council. 83 This system requires all other traders in diamonds, from the rough diamond
importers to in-country traders, polishers, dealers, and manufacturers, to adhere to a
warranty system by which the invoice for the diamonds is printed with the following
language: “The diamonds herein invoiced have been purchased from legitimate sources
not involved in funding conflict and in compliance with United Nations resolutions. The
seller hereby guarantees that these diamonds are conflict free, based on personal
knowledge and/or written guarantees provided by the supplier of these diamonds.”84
¶24
The system of warranties is undergirded by several key commitments, including: 1)
to limit trade only to those companies that include the required warranty on their
invoices, 2) to avoid buying any diamonds originating in non-participant countries or
from unknown or suspect suppliers, 3) to avoid purchasing diamonds from sources found
through due process to have violated government regulations governing conflict
diamonds, 4) to avoid buying diamonds from any region that is under an advisory from a
governmental authority stating that conflict diamonds have originated there, 5) to refrain
from knowingly engaging in the purchase or sale of conflict diamonds or assisting others
77

Id.
Clean Diamond Trade Act, 19 U.S.C. §3901 (2003).
79
Joost Pauwelyn, WTO Compassion or Superiority Complex?: What to Make of the WTO Waiver for
“Conflict Diamonds”, 24 M ICH. J. INT ’L L. 1177, 1178 (2003); World Trade Organization, Waiver
Concerning Kimberley Process Certification Scheme for Rough Diamonds, Decision of May 15, 2003,
WT/L/518 (2003). The 11 states are Australia, Brazil, Canada, Israel, Japan, Korea, Philippines, Sierra
Leone, Thailand, United Arab Emirates, and United States.
80
World Trade Organization, supra note 79.
81
W ORLD DIAMOND COUNCIL, supra note 46, at 1-2.
82
Id.
83
Id. at 12.
84
Id. at 5.
78
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in doing so, and 6) to ensure that all company employees engaged in the diamond trade
are well informed of the resolutions and government regulations governing the trade. 85
¶25
While each participant in the process is expected to maintain auditable records of
warranties received and issued, and risks expulsion from diamond industry institutions
for failure to comply with the above tenets or the warranty system itself, the process postexport is almost entirely self- governed, and few other constraints exist. 86 Diamonds from
multiple shipments may be intermixed, and the actual Kimberley certificate is not
required to follow them. 87 Further, the end- use retailers are not even required to provide
the above-quoted warranty directly to consumers. 88 Rather, they need only inform their
suppliers that they require a warranty from them, and keep those warranties for at least
five years. 89
¶26
The Kimberley Process participant group is uniquely structured, in that the World
Diamond Council and NGOs Global Witness and Partnership Africa Canada serve
equally with participant nations on several of the working groups and committees
overseen by the Chair. 90 As of June 2005, a total of 67 countries, including all of the
major diamond trading and producing countries, were participants in the Kimberley
Process and had established national export/import controls for keeping out conflict
diamonds. 91 The current Kimberley Chair is Russia. 92 The three Working Groups are
Monitoring, Statistics, and Diamond Experts, while the two Committees are Participation
and Selection. 93 The entire group meets in plenary session once annually in October. 94
The UN General Assembly consistently invites the Kimberley Process Chair country’s
Permanent Representative to the United Nations to report on the progress of
85

Id. at 2-3.
Id. at 2-8.
87
Id. at 2-8.
88
Id. at 2-8.
89
Id. at 2-8.
90
Kimberley Process, Kimberley Structure,
http://www.kimberleyprocess.com:8080/site/?name=structure&PHPSESSID=c41de38ba0531684be038095
ec851ee6 (last visited Oct. 2, 2005).
91
GLOBAL W ITNESS, IMPLEMENTING THE KIMBERLEY PROCESS: 5 YEARS ON – HOW EFFECTIVE IS THE
KIMBERLEY PROCESS AND WHAT M ORE NEEDS TO BE DONE? at 1 (June 2005),
http://www.globalwitness.org/reports/show.php/en.00074.html.
92
Kimberley Process, http://www.kimberleyprocess.com:8080/site/?name=home (last visited October 2,
2005).
93
The Working Group on Monitoring, tasked with overseeing and assessing the implementation of the
KPCS, is chaired by the European Community with assistance from Israel. Members of the committee
include seven nations, the World Diamond Council, and the two most outspoken NGOs throughout the
process – Global Witness and Partnership Africa Canada. The Working Group on Statistics, responsible
for ensuring timely reporting and analysis on statistical data regarding the diamond trade, is chaired by
Canada, with assistance from South Africa. Seven participant country members and Partnership Africa
Canada comprise the Working Group’s members. The Diamond Experts Working Group is tasked with
devising solutions to technical problems encountered in the implementation of KPCS. It is headed by the
World Diamond Council with membership of seven nations and Partnership Africa Canada. The
Participation Committee assists the Chair in handling the admission of new participants, and is chaired by
Canada with Botswana as Vice-Chair, nine participant nation members, the World Diamond Council, and
Global Witness/Partnership Africa Canada. And finally, the Selection Committee assesses the credentials
of candidates for Vice Chair, who will succeed the Chair in its duties the following year. This committee is
chaired by Russia (the current Chair of the Kimberley Process), with assistance from Botswana (the 2006
Chair of the Kimberley Process), and participation from twelve other participant nations. Kimberley
Process, supra note 90.
94
Id.
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implementing the KPCS to the Assembly at its annual session. 95 The 2004 report by
then-Chair Canada prompted a December draft resolution reaffirming the General
Assembly’s support for the KPCS.96
III. SUCCESSES AND IMPROVEMENT OPPORTUNITIES FOR THE KIMBERLEY P ROCESS
¶27

The unprecedented nature and fledgling success of the Kimberley Process leads
inevitably to questions about what sparked it, how it evolved, and whether it will truly
succeed. Both achievements and flaws of the development process, the protocol itself,
and its implementation can be instructive in understanding how the force of the complex
entanglement of international bodies, non- governmental organizations, and world
governments may be brought to bear to ultimately hold corporations responsible for the
impact that they have on human rights issues. Several aspects of the diamond trade and
this particular conflict render the Kimberley Process unique and difficult to replicate, yet
others can be quite instructive.
A. Positive Attributes of the Kimberley Process
1. Inception

¶28

Perhaps the most striking quality of the Kimberley Process is that it exists at all.
On its face, the process seems to have materialized spontaneously from diamondproducing countries’ and companies’ grave concern for the plight of the people
victimized by conflict diamonds – hardly a common occurrence. But the constant,
strident call of NGOs was more likely the true catalyst for action. The 1998 Global
Witness report launched a barrage of unceasing reports and campaigns – at least one per
year sponsored by as many as six different NGOs - that culminated in a protest, albeit
small, in front of one of the world’s most prestigious jewelry retailers in New York
City. 97 Even after Kimberley Process meetings commenced, the NGO community
reacted quickly to begin to influence the development of a certification process - a
coalition of 73 NGOs organized the Campaign to Eliminate Conflict Diamonds, launched
on Valentine’s Day 2001, to encourage meaningful implementing legislation in the US
that it hoped would spur international adoption of stringent certification measures in the
Kimberley Process. 98
¶29
Even now, a hallmark of the Kimberley Process is that Partnership Africa Canada
and Global Witness remain intimately involved, serving on Working Groups and
participating in negotiating sessions. Because the sessions are not open to the media,
95

Permanent Representative of Canada to the United Nations, Letter Dated 24 November 2004 from the
Permanent Representative of Canada to the United Nations Addressed to the President of the General
Assembly, U.N. Doc. A/59/590 (Nov. 29, 2004), available at http://documents-ddsny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N04/626/72/pdf/N0462672.pdf?OpenElement; General Assembly [GAOR],
Draft Resolution, The Role of Diamonds in Fueling Conflict: Breaking the Link Between the Illicit
Transaction of Rough Diamonds and Armed Conflict as a Contribution to Prevention and Settlement of
Conflicts, ¶ 11, U.N. Doc. A/59/L.46 (Dec. 8, 2004), available at http://documents-ddsny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/LTD/N04/639/65/pdf/N0463965.pdf?OpenElement.
96
GAOR, supra note 95.
97
Feldman, supra note 30, at 848.
98
TAMM, supra note 26, at 25.
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these NGOs disseminate their results to the public. And they continue to hold the process
and its participants accountable as well – constantly outlining opportunities for
improvement through reports, surveys, and studies.
¶30
The NGOs’ own enforcement mechanism remains the threat of a consumer boycott.
The groups recognize that the legitimate diamond trade is vital to the rehabilitation and
survival of the impacted areas and many others like them, and as long as they are
satisfied that the process is progressing, they have deliberately avoided large-scale
consumer boycotts and mass media campaigns that could ruin the entire industry. 99 In
addition to protecting the legitimate diamond trade, though, there is also a delicate
symbiosis between the governed businesses and the participating NGOs. The NGOs
recognize that their continued close involvement with the process will ensure it maintains
momentum toward full implementation and further improvements, so they are likely
reluctant to take drastic activist measures like boycotts that could undermine their
participation and ultimately result in the process’s breakdown. At the same time, though,
the specter of ruin posed by consumer boycotts and mass media campaigns is sufficiently
compelling to keep the diamond industry on the path of progress. Hence, these tactics
remain the most powerful weapons in the NGO arsenal in the event that progress stalls or
support begins to waver.
¶31
But surely NGO pressure alone cannot be credited with the creation of this
unprecedented monitoring mechanism. In fact, the groups have only engaged here in the
same tactics that they have honed over decades, and not all of their campaigns have
enjoyed nearly the same international attention and success. So another unique quality
must be at play – the vulnerability of the target companies. To be sure, the threat of a
boycott of the diamond industry, and the inevitable taint that would ensue, was likely
sufficient to encourage participation by the industry. But the ease of that participation
may be attributable to a few key factors.
¶32
First, the diamond industry is particularly unique in that, like the fur industry that
had been crippled by consumer protest before it, it is founded on a luxury item the
intrinsic value of which derives from consumers’ perceptions of its intangible qualities. 100
As soon as those intangible qualities are tainted, the value of the product is irrevocably
undermined. Further, the retail market for diamonds was heavily concentrated in a single
location, the United States, 101 and therefore easily accessible by NGOs for inciting a
99

Id. at 25.
Price, supra note 40, at 42.
101
“U.S. diamond market demand is the largest in the world.” Cook, supra note 22, at 3. Within the
Harmonized Tariff Schedule (HTS) categories identified in the Kimberley Process, the US imported 6.18
million carats worth $611 million in 1998, 7.42 million carats worth $755 million in 1999, 4.92 million
carats worth $816 million in 2000, 3.39 million carats worth $597 million in 2001, 3.13 million carats
worth $608 million in 2002, 3.81 million carats worth $776 million in 2003, and 2.54 million carats worth
$598 million in the first nine months of 2004 (January-September, compared to 3.01 million carats worth
$563 million in the same period of 2003). Calculated from data available on United States International
Trade Commission, Interactive Tariff and Trade Web, http://dataweb.usitc.gov/ (last visited Nov. 22,
2004). The included categories are HTS 7102.10 (diamonds, unsorted), 7102.21 (diamonds, industrial,
unworked or simply sawn, cleaved or bruted), and 7102.31 (diamonds, nonindustrial, unworked or simply
sawn, cleaved or bruted). KIMBERLEY PROCESS, THE KIMBERLEY PROCESS CERTIFICATION SCHEME at 4,
http://www.kimberleyprocess.com:8080/site/content/KPCS.pdf (last visited Oct. 31, 2004). In the first
quarter of 2003 (January-May), the US’s diamond imports from Belgium (through which 85% of the
world’s diamonds pass) were larger than any other nation. Antwerp World Diamond Center Trade
Statistics, http://www.hrd.be/productservices/import_export_services/trade_statistics.aspx (last visited Nov.
100
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boycott, as well as particularly threatening to the diamond industry’s survival were
consumer backlash to take hold. Additionally, conflict diamonds are believed to
represent at most 15% of the global diamond trade. 102 Accordingly, there was little risk
of a significant loss in revenues to any single participant in the diamond production
pipeline if these diamonds were effectively removed from the trade.
¶33
And finally, De Beers wields enormous power in the industry. Despite the fact that
the diamond industry is comprised of a complex maze of multiple companies throughout
the pipeline, it is unquestionably dominated by the South African conglomerate. 103 And
De Beers therefore bore not only a significant risk were a consumer boycott to take hold,
but also had other financial reasons that could prove an embrace of the certification
process particularly fruitful. De Beers had founded its influence in the market on a
strategy of buying up and stockpiling rough diamonds in order to match market output to
demand and maintain artificially high prices for the stones. 104 Removing conflict
diamonds from the trade would constrain the market and present De Beers an opportunity
to begin to unload some of its $4 billion stockpile without diluting prices. 105
¶34
Further, the company’s ability to leverage its existing stockpile coupled with its
control of 65% of the rough diamond trade allowed De Beers to extract itself altogether
from the “outside” market – the 35% it did not control – including from contentious
Angola. 106 And finally, De Beers was able to announce in May 2000 that it would
provide written guarantees of the legitimacy of its diamonds. 107 Accordingly, De Beers
stood to gain from the institution of a certification process and the elimination of conflict
diamonds from the trade. These advantages likely proved influential in the diamond
industry’s creation of its own representative to the Kimberley Process, the World
Diamond Council, and the WDC’s subsequent, seminal participation in the process’s
development.
2. Self-Initiated and Self-Policed
¶35

Certainly, too, it must be argued that other positive qualities emanate from a selfinitiated commitment to reform, namely legitimacy, practicality, and adherence. This is
particularly applicable in the instance of the Kimberley Process, because virtually all
players in all aspects of the process, from national government to transnational
corporation to international governing body to non-governmental organization, were
intimately involved in its development. Hence, the logistical aspects of the certification
and warranty schemes are presumably practically achievable by the diamond industry and
the participant governments, as they designed them themselves. Similarly, with the
voluntary development and end-to-end ownership of the process comes some measure of
buy- in and legitimacy, which likely trans lates into improved adherence and enforcement.

20, 2004); Conflict Diamonds: Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Trade of the Committee on Ways and
Means House of Representatives, 107th Cong. 5 (2001) (statement of Congressman Crane).
102
Hearing, supra note 1, at 7 (testimony of Loren Yager).
103
Stein, supra note 29.
104
TAMM, supra note 26, at 24-25.
105
Id.
106
Id.
107
Id. at 24.
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Hence, the Kimberley Process grew not from a unilateral UN mandate, but from an
organic interplay of pressures in the world community. After years of UN sanctions in
the region had proven unsuccessful, NGOs imposed significant pressure on the industry,
which for various reasons was particularly vulnerable to that pressure, and the UN, US,
and ultimately the WTO consistently validated the approach taken to alleviate the
problem.
B. Perceived Flaws and Areas of Improvement for the Process
1. Timing to Implementation

¶37

Certainly, however, this approach is not without its problems. First, the timing to
implementation, in light of the unique nature of this situation, was too protracted. 108 As
tentative peace accords have been reached in all four impacted regions, the threat of
conflict diamonds has already begun to wane. 109 This is not to say that the Kimberley
Process cannot be a valuable tool for quelling more traditional smuggling, illicit trade,
and potential terrorist financing. But the human rights implications are diminished, and
the greatest potential impact of the process in preventing atrocities and saving lives lost.
Arguably, while implementation of the scheme may have been rapid in the context of the
timing of typical human rights movements, it simply took too long for the world
community to react to the failed UN sanctions, and even after the Kimberley Process was
underway, discord and disagreement caused significant delays in its implementation.
What was to be ready for implementation by the beginning of 2002 was not truly in place
until July of 2003, over three years after the initial meeting in Kimberley, South Africa,
and five years after news of conflict diamonds’ existence was first broken by Global
Witness.
2. Waning and Splintered Interest

¶38

The harms of having missed the window of opportunity for maximum impact are
compounded by perceptions that because the worst of the conflicts may be over, the
Kimberley Process is somehow complete and successful. Perhaps most alarming are
statements to that effect from the October 2004 World Diamond Congress. 110 Unlike the
past several years in which the conflict diamond issue dominated the annual Congress,
the focus was instead upon the threat that manufactured stones posed to the legitimate
diamond market, and an announcement of a major initiative to defend the natural
diamond in the marketplace. 111
108

Certainly, in the broader context of the typical timing of human rights movements, the move from
recognition of the issue to implementation of a global solution was rapid, but under the specific
circumstances, the process still did not move quickly enough to achieve maximum effectiveness.
109
Global Witness, Rich Man, Poor Man (Oct. 2004),
http://www.globalwitness.org/reports/show.php/en.00064.html.
110
The World Diamond Congress was first held in 1947. It serves as the “forum for the two most
important representative organizations in the diamond business, the World Federation of Diamond Bourses
(WFDB) and the International Diamond Manufacturers Association (IDMA).” World Federation of
Diamond Bourses, Final Preparations Being Made in New York City for 31st World Diamond Congress
Starting Oct. 17 (Oct. 5, 2004),
http://www.worldfed.com/website/newsletter/World%20Diamond%20Congress.doc.
111
Professional Jeweler, Consumer Confidence Focus of World Diamond Congress (Oct. 22, 2004),
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¶39

Conflict diamond issues were only discussed at the instigation of Amnesty
International and Global Witness, who had been invited to the meeting to present findings
and concerns resulting from their most recent studies of Kimberley Process
implementation. 112 In response to their presentation, Schmuel Schnitzer, president of the
World Federation of Diamond Bourses, stated that “‘Our 23 affiliated bourses have
agreed there is no problem implementing the Kimberley Process. All members are fully
able to comply with the Process. . . . It is impossible, simply impossible, for conflict
diamonds to sneak through.’”113 Newly elected president of the International Diamond
Manufacturers Association Jeffrey Fischer then asserted “‘We see conflict in Africa
down, and as such the Kimberley Process has largely accomplished its goal.’”114 In light
of the very findings being presented by Amnesty and Global Witness regarding the
paucity of effective internal controls and the failure of diamond retailers to successfully
implement and communicate the system of warranties, these statements seem misguided
at best. While the WDC also adopted a resolution encouraging the continued
implementation of and compliance with the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme and
the system of warranties, the leaders’ statements bespeak their true impressions of the
urgency of this issue.
¶40
Even the NGO community’s vigilance seems to be waning, and its focus
fragmenting. In past years, the annual plenary meeting of the Kimberley Process has
been followed by a flurry of press releases and opinion statements from the leading
NGOs offering a critique of the meetings, progress, and outstanding opportunities for
improvement. After the October 2004 plenary meeting, Global Witness issued one press
release offering a brief analysis, but the websites of the other two major NGOs in the
process, Amnesty International and Partnership Afric a Canada, showed nothing. 115
Coupled with the WDC’s shift away from a focus on the issue, this inaction by the NGOs
demonstrates a dangerous loss of a sense of urgency and interest in two of the most vital
groups to keeping the Kimberley Process on track – the NGOs and the diamond industry.
¶41
With regard to the NGOs, this waning interest may be both explained and
compounded by a seeming intimation that the Kimberley Process alone may not provide
an adequate framework to solve all of the problems arising from the diamond trade.
While NGO reporting on the diamond trade has picked up again, it is with a more
fragmented focus – not merely criticism and recommendations for the Kimberley
Process, but introduction of new initiatives, 116 calls for the United Nations to continue

http://www.professionaljeweler.com/archives/news/2004/102204story.html.
112
These findings will be presented and discussed in detail later in the paper.
113
Id.
114
Id.
115
Confirmed through visits and searches on www.amnesty.org, www.pacweb.org, and
www.globalwitness.org on Nov. 23, 2004.
116
“The Diamond Development Initiative emerges from a recognition that the underlying problems of
Africa’s alluvial diamond operations and its estimated one million artisanal miners lie beyond the KPCS,
and have not yet been addressed.” The Diamond Development Initiative is a separate, multilateral
partnership involving several of the same companies, NGOs, governments and development agencies
originally committed to the Kimberley Process. It intends to devise and integrate various initiatives to
assist artisanal miners, with an initial meeting slated to occur in Africa in October or November 2005. Press
Release, Global Witness, Diamond Development Initiative Begins (Aug. 17, 2005),
http://www.globalwitness.org/press_releases/display2.php?id=305.
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sanctions and other more traditional means of forced compliance, 117 and news of violence
and illicit activity stemming from regions far outside the original three culprit
countries. 118 This diversion from the initial focus could prove detrimental to the ultimate
effectiveness of the Kimberley Process as a comprehensive scheme.
3. Self- Governance
¶42

Moreover, the self- governance that is the hallmark of the process’s development
may well prove its Achilles’ heel. Since its inception, this single attribute has been
blamed by NGOs and others for a panoply of issues encountered by the process. In his
February 2002 testimony, the Director of International Affairs and Trade of the General
Accounting Office found that lack of accountability was the primary problem with the
Kimberley Process, stating that “[w]ithout effective accountability, the certification
scheme may provide the appearance of control while still allowing conflict diamonds to
enter the legitimate diamond trade and, as a result, continue to fuel conflict.”119
¶43
Among the GAO’s primary areas of concern for the scheme stemming from its
ethos of voluntary participation and self- governance are: 1) adoption of the Scheme’s
recommended internal controls is entirely optional and the expectation is that each
participant will create appropriate internal controls voluntarily at the national level; 2)
after the initial rough diamond certification, the remainder of the diamond pipeline is
governed only by voluntary participation in the chain of warranties, which is entirely selfregulated and self- monitored; 3) several issues exist with regard to consistency,
documentation, and dissemination of statistical data; and 4) monitoring is based upon one
participant’s request that another participant be reviewed, the partic ipant in question must
consent to a review mission, no guidelines exist for self-assessments, no monitoring
scheme exists for the system of warranties, and no external audit exists. 120 Based upon
these findings, the GAO recommended that “the Secretary of State in consultation with
the relevant government agencies work with Kimberley Process participants to develop
better controls including a reasonable control environment, risk assessment, internal
controls, information-sharing, and monitoring.”121 Follow- up research and analysis by
117

“While the [National Transitional Government of Liberia] has passed the appropriate laws and
regulations to implement and enforce the certification scheme required for acceptance into the Kimberley
process, and passed laws and regulations to maintain dissuasive and proportional penalties for
transgressions, there is currently no capacity to enforce the laws or prosecute any infringements rendering
the laws cosmetic. It is critical that the Security Council maintains diamond sanctions.” Global Witness,
Open Letter to the UN Security Council, Regarding Conflict Resources and Peacekeeping in Liberia and
the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) (Mar. 18, 2005), available at
http://www.globalwitness.org/reports/index.php?section=diamonds.
118
“. . . the massacre of 29 diamond diggers on the Roosevelt Indian Reserve in the remote Rondônia
rainforest in 2004 attracted international media attention and demonstrated that conflict diamonds are by no
means restricted to Africa.” PARTNERSHIP A FRICA CANADA, THE FAILURE OF GOOD INTENTIONS: FRAUD,
THEFT AND M URDER IN THE BRAZILIAN DIAMOND INDUSTRY at 1 (May 2005),
http://www.pacweb.org/e/images/stories/brazil%20report%20_final_electronic%20version.pdf. Brazil is a
memb er of the KPCS.
119
The report proceeds to recommend that the Kimberley Process govern itself like an organization, and
encourages the adoption of five key control elements – control environment, risk assessment, control
activities, information and communications, and monitoring. Hearing, supra note 1, at 11-16 (testimony of
Loren Yager).
120
Hearing, supra note 1, at 11-16 (testimony of Loren Yager).
121
General Accounting Office, United States General Accounting Office Report to Congressional
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the GAO for a November 2003 report on terrorists’ alternative financing mechanisms
confirmed that these weaknesses remained and could be exploited by terrorist
financiers. 122
¶44
NGOs have consistently echoed these concerns. While the Kimberley Process had
made some strides by the October 2003 plenary meeting, instituting requirements that all
participants report annually on their implementation efforts and conduct voluntary review
visits, particularly when there is suspicion of non-comp liance by a participant country, 123
the NGO community, joined by the World Diamond Council and governments of the
United States, South Africa, Canada, Israel, and the European Commission, still
considers regular, impartial monitoring the only scheme that could truly legitimize the
process. 124 While the Kimberley Process has still not gone that far, NGOs did
acknowledge, in response to the October 2004 plenary, that some progress had been
made in the establishment of a peer review system by which a significant number of
countries had already been reviewed. 125 But they focused their attention upon another
issue emanating from self- governance: “the lack of action to improve the collection and
analysis of rough diamond production and trade statistics,” imploring the process to
implement the rough diamond database system that had been agreed over two years
before. 126
¶45
Four recent developments speak to each of the four flaws highlighted by the GAO
and echoed consistently by NGOs and others. In anticipation of the 2004 plenary
meeting of the Kimberley Process, Global Witness and Partnership Africa Canada
released a report surveying the relative successes of a selection of eight participant
countries in implementing internal controls. 127 In the spring and summer of 2004, Glo bal
Witness and Amnesty International conducted surveys of diamond retailers to discern
whether the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme had truly taken hold at the endpoint
of the diamond pipeline, demonstrating flaws in the system of warranties and its
voluntary nature. 128 In October 2004, Global Witness reported that Russia, slated to be

Requesters: Critical Issues Remain in Deterring Conflict Diamond Trade at 22 (June 2002), GAO-02-678,
http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-02-678.
122
General Accounting Office, United States General Accounting Office Report to Congressional
Requesters: Terrorist Financing: U.S. Agencies Should Systematically Assess Terrorists’ Use of Alternative
Financing Mechanisms at 30 (Nov. 2003), GAO-04-163, http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d04163.pdf.
123
Global Witness released a statement in April 2003, after the first plenary meeting of the Kimberley
Process Certification Scheme, expressing concerns about the failure to establish “a regular, effective
monitoring mechanism to assess over time all national diamond control systems and meet the threshold of
trust and credibility that consumers want.” Press Release, Global Witness, Kimberley Process Still In
Process (Apr. 30, 2003), http://www.globalwitness.org/press_releases/display2.php?id=193. The NGO
community followed up on these concerns at the October 2003 plenary meeting, presenting the meeting
with the Diamond Pledge, a petition of 6,000 signatures calling on the Kimberley Process to implement
independent, regular monitoring of all participant countries. The original KPCS had called for mandatory
review of all participant countries at four-year intervals. Other concerns expressed by Global Witness at the
April 2003 meeting included membership criteria, participant coordination, participant failure to pass and
enforce implementing legislation domestically, and accurate statistical reporting. Id.
124
Amnesty International, supra note 15.
125
Press Release, Global Witness, Progress and Setbacks at Kimberley Process Plenary (Oct. 29, 2004),
http://www.globalwitness.org/press_releases/display2.php?id=258.
126
Id.
127
Global Witness, The Key to Kimberley: Internal Diamond Controls (Oct. 2004),
http://www.globalwitness.org/reports/show.php/en.00063.html.
128
Global Witness and Amnesty International, Déjà Vu: Diamond Industry Still Failing to Deliver on
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the next Chair of the Kimberley Process, had still yet to provide any statistics about its
own diamond trade. 129 And in July 2004 came the first demonstration of the Kimberley
Process’s monitoring and enforcement capabilities, as it removed the Republic of Congo
from participation in the process after a review of their diamond trade practices, 130
prompting the country to institute new legislation and better internal controls. 131 In
combination, these recent findings demonstrate that while there has been marginal
progress, underlying substantive issues remain to be improved.
i) Voluntary Internal Controls
¶46
Global Witness and Partnership Africa Canada analyzed the implementing
legislation and internal controls of eight Kimberley Process participants - Ghana, Angola,
the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the European Union, Belgium, the United
Kingdom, Canada, and the United States - to discern distinctive models and best
practices. 132 It is important to note that each of these has introduced elaborate schemes
for ensuring a clean diamond trade, so the study does not begin to address the host of
participant nations that have not instituted any internal controls. 133
¶47
The study found that while noble efforts had been made, and often very complex
systems were envisioned, on the whole there remained opportunities for improvement. 134
The overarching issue is that “‘[g]overnmental controls at the point of export in these
countries are in place, but there are almost no controls one or two transactions back into
the system,’” according to Global Witness representative Corinna Gilfillan. 135 The
Belgian system was found to be the most complete and comprehensive, but was not yet
fully implemented and operational. 136 The systems of the United States, Britain, and
Canada were faulted for having weak or non-existent government audit procedures for
companies in the trade. 137
¶48
But particularly lacking were the systems of Angola and the Democratic Republic
of the Congo, two centers of conflict diamond activity and the only two major exporters
of rough diamonds in the study. With regard to Angola, the study found that “[t]here is,
at present, no assurance that Angola’s internal controls prevent diamonds from leaving or
entering the country illegally.”138 And with regard to the Democratic Republic of the
Congo, the report stated that:

Promises (Oct. 2004),
http://web.amnesty.org/library/pdf/POL340082004ENGLISH/$File/POL3400804.pdf.
129
Press Release, Global Witness, Progress on Conflict Diamo nds Compromised by Lack of Russian
Statistics (Oct. 21, 2004), http://www.globalwitness.org/press_releases/display2.php?id=256.
130
Press Release, Global Witness, The Kimberley Process Gets Some Teeth (July 9, 2004),
http://www.globalwitness.org/press_releases/display2.php?id=248.
131
Ketan Tanna, Congo (Brazzaville) Initiates Diamond Reform (Aug. 12, 2004),
http://www.diamonds.net/news/newsitem.asp?num=10170.
132
Global Witness, supra note 127, at 2.
133
Id.
134
Id.
135
Press Release, Global Witness, Weak Controls and “Poverty Diamonds,” (Oct. 22, 2004),
http://www.globalwitness.org/press_releases/display2.php?id=257.
136
Global Witness, supra note 127, at 12-14.
137
Global Witness, supra note 135.
138
Global Witness, supra note 127, at 7.
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[i]n practice . . . given the lack of control over the négociant/middleman
link of the chain, and the almost complete absence of information about
diggers, there is little knowledge of where the diamonds entering the chain
at the comptoir level originate, or even, potentially whether they were
mined in the DRC, other than through physical identification of the
stones. 139
¶49

Ultimately, in addition to a series of recommendations regarding continuous
strengthening and funding of government oversight bodies and closure of loopholes in
those countries supporting primarily artisanal alluvial mines, 140 the study made the
following three recommendations for all participant countries that import and trade
diamonds: 1) mandate random, independent government inspections of diamond
importing, trading, and manufacturing companies to ensure compliance with the
Kimberley Process; 2) require companies to develop internal management schemes that
ensure that self- regulation is operating effectively and perform random reviews of
company audits for accuracy and completeness; and 3) introduce a legally binding
protocol to support systems of self- regulation. 141 While it is somewhat heartening that
several nations have made concerted efforts to institute significant controls, these
findings bear out the overarching concerns expressed by NGOs and others with regard to
voluntary implementation of internal controls and self- governance.

ii) System of Warranties
¶50
In 2004, Amnesty International and Global Witness launched a global survey of
over 800 jewelry retailers and suppliers in nine countries to discern their commitment to
and implementation of the voluntary system of warranties. 142 In October 2004, they
released preliminary results of the United Kingdom and United States portions of the
survey, comprised of letters to 85 major diamond jewelry retailers and visits to 579
stores. 143 Fewer than 20% of those who responded in writing “provided a meaningful
account of their policy,”144 while only 42% of retailers visited in-store were “able to give
consumers meaningful assurances that diamonds are conflict free.”145
¶51
Amnesty and Global Witness concluded from these and other findings that the
voluntary system of warranties is not succeeding, and that retailers and suppliers are not

139

“Artisanal miners, known as ‘creusers’, sell diamonds on to middlemen, known as ‘trafficants’ or
‘négociants’, who then sell to the licensed exporters or ‘comptoirs’.” Id. at 9, 11.
140
The Government of South Africa defines artisanal mining as “small-scale mining involving the
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taking it seriously enough. 146 The findings were presented to the October 2004 World
Diamond Congress, along with recommendations that industry bodies devise a common
standard to verify compliance with the voluntary system of warranties and retailers’
commitments to institute policies and educate employees accordingly. 147 As discussed
above, the outcome of the presentation at the WDC was no more than a resolution
encouraging members to continue to implement the system of warranties and educate
their employees accordingly. 148
¶52
The NGOs also made several recommendations to participant governments,
including improved monitoring and rigorous auditing, and the diamond retail sector itself,
including strict application of the system of warranties and supplier selection, written
assurances to customers, education and training on conflict diamonds and the KPCS as a
condition of employment, and proactive lobbying of peers within the industry for
adoption of these tactics. 149 These findings and recommendations echo a report by Global
Witness on the results of the broader survey, released in March 2004. 150 The studies
indicate that the Kimberley Process’s significant reliance on the voluntary system of
warranties for protecting the entire diamond pipeline post-export of rough diamonds may
be misplaced, insufficient, and fundamentally flawed.
iii) Statistical Reporting
In October 2004, Global Witness first brought attention to another issue exemplary
of one of the primary concerns plaguing the Kimberley Process – statistical reporting. 151
Many countries’ statistical data submissions are significantly delayed and use different
reporting methodologies, which makes for “comparative statistical inaccuracy.”152
Several participant countries either submit their statistics late or not at all, without any
penalty, despite the fact that statistical reporting is a fundamental element of Kimberley
Process membership and compliance. 153 And others, among them Canada and the US, the
largest consumer of diamond jewelry in the world, do not record any data from
Kimberley Process certificates because they have other trade data recording procedures in
place, rendering it impossible to make accurate comparisons across participants. 154
¶54
Particularly troubling is Russia’s longstanding refusal to submit any statistics at
all, 155 despite the fact that it is one of the world’s largest diamond producers, it has been a
significant participant in the Kimberley Process almost since its inception, and it is the
current Chair of the Kimberley Process. 156 At the 2004 plenary meeting of the KPCS,
Russia explained that the submission of its statistics “had been delayed for internal
administrative reasons,” and claimed that it would provide the necessary statistical
¶53
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reports by December 31, 2004. 157 This eleventh hour compliance with the KPCS’s
statistical reporting requirements hardly left time for the body to remove Russia as 2005
Chair had the statistical reports yielded any alarming discoveries. The failure to enforce
the process’s reporting requirements on one of the largest, high-profile producers who
soon became tasked with enforcing the process itself is demonstrative of a significant
shortcoming in the process’s framework, mandate, and enforcement of consistent and
accurate statistical reporting, which can ultimately undermine meaningful enforcement of
the process as a whole.
¶55
The 2004 plenary made some attempts at improvements to the flawed statistical
reporting process. 158 Yet these essentially amounted to a change in the expiration of
statistical data, a request that the Working Group on Statistics study how national
reporting mechanisms constrain KPCS reporting for a report to be delivered at the 2005
plenary, and a request that the Working Group on Statistics and the Working Group on
Diamond Experts work together to study and propose ways to harmonize the different
valuation techniques for rough diamonds that generate statistical discrepancies. 159 As
discussed above, Global Witness and Partnership Africa Canada found these minor
measures to be a dereliction of responsibility, stating that “‘[t]he lack of progress on
statistics jeopardizes the credibility of the KPCS and robs it of an essential tool in the
fight against conflict diamonds.’”160
iv) Monitoring/Enforcement Mechanism
Both the consequences of the failure to mandate the true implementation and
enforcement of internal controls and the mettle of the existing monitoring system were
bolstered in July 2004, when the Kimberley Process expelled the Republic of Congo 161 as
a participant. 162 Like the Russian problem, this incident is particularly demonstrative of
the importance of consistent, accurate, and meaningful statistics and reporting
mechanisms. While the Republic of Congo was admitted to the process in 2003 because
it had passed regulations intended to implement the process’s minimum requirements, the
focus at the time had only been on whether criteria were met on paper, not in actual
practice. Due to concern that the country’s rough diamond exports greatly exceeded its
production capacity potential, the Kimberley Process launched a review mission to the
Republic of Congo in May 2004, spearheaded by South Africa. 163
¶57
The mission determined that the Republic of Congo’s controls were “inadequate,
poorly enforced, and therefore unable to prevent conflict diamonds from entering the
legitimate diamond trade. 164 The mission’s findings confirmed well-documented
¶56
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evidence of the [Republic of Congo]’s role as a center for rampant diamond
smuggling.”165 In fact, investigators found that the Republic of Congo’s official diamond
exports exceeded production by 100%, for which the authorities in the country could
make no explanation. 166 This resulted in a finding that insufficient controls existed to
ensure that Kimberley Process Certificates were only being produced for diamonds
legitimately mined in the country, and not those smuggled in from elsewhere. 167
¶58
Global Witness, the World Diamond Council, and others were inspired by this
historic action, which prompted an encouraging response from the Republic of Congo
within a month. 168 The country announced reforms including improved controls and
organization at mines, stricter controls on dealers, and improved trading methods. 169 This
situation, while demonstrative of the process’s ability to enforce its goals, ultimately begs
more questions than it answers. It remains to be seen whether the changes instituted by
the government will be sufficient, what process the Kimberley group will follow to
determine whether improvement has been significant enough to warrant re-admittance,
and what follow-on monitoring will be employed to prevent such transgressions in
future. 170
¶59
The KPCS demonstrated additional progress in the realm of monitoring and
enforcement at the 2004 plenary. 171 In particular, the peer review system adopted at the
prior year’s plenary had actually been put into action. 172 Eight participants had already
hosted review visits and another seven were slated to do so before the end of 2004. 173
Thirty-three participants had already invited review visits, and the plenary encouraged the
remaining ten to follow suit. 174
¶60
As of June 2005, Global Witness reported that there were eight outstanding
participants that had yet to volunteer to receive a review visit: Bulgaria, China, Croatia,
Korea, Laos, Namibia, Thailand and Venezuela. 175 Of these, Namibia and China are of
particular concern, as Namibia is the only major diamond producer who has yet to
volunteer for a review visit, and China’s burgeoning diamond market is expected to be
huge. 176 Additionally, Global Witness implored the KPCS to conduct a first-time review
of all participants by the end of 2006, establish a six- month follow-up process to ensure
165
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recommendations are implemented, require participants to report back to the plenary
session on progress, make all review reports public, and devise a system of internal
country controls that ensure all rough diamonds exported are conflict- free. 177 Until
meaningful observations and actual sanctions emerge from these invitation-only peer
reviews, they will not be fully legitimized as valid enforcement mechanisms.
¶61
These observations culminate to render a portrait of an imperfect process – one
whose pride in self- governance may also prove its downfall. 178 Each of the learnings,
both positive and negative, from inception to implementation, may prove instructive to
other attempts by the international community to enforce corporate responsibility for
human rights.
IV. THE UN’S RECENT FOCUS ON CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
A. History of Corporate Social Responsibility in the International Context
¶62

The triumphs and pitfalls of the Kimberley Process’s inception, ratification, and
implementation can be particularly instructive in light of the UN’s recently renewed
effort to enforce transnational corporations’ responsibility for sustaining human rights
where they operate. The foundation of corporate responsibility for human rights, as well
as the modern conception of human rights generally, is based in the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights. 179 While aimed at states, the Declaration is arguably
rendered applicable to businesses as well through its appeal to “every organ of society” to
uphold human rights. 180 In the 1970s and 1980s, the UN attempted unsuccessfully to
draft international codes of conduct for businesses. At the same time, other international
organizations began to codify an expectation of corporate social responsibility, including
the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development’s (OECD) Guidelines for
Multinational Enterprises in 1976, and the International Labor Organization’s (ILO) 1977
Tripartite Declaration of Principles Concerning Multinational Enterprises. 181
¶63
These efforts spurred a rash of voluntary, internal corporate codes of conduct
throughout the 1980s and 1990s. 182 But not until 1999 did the UN truly codify its
expectations for corporate social responsibility in the Global Compact, an initiative
encouraging corporations to voluntarily participate in a network of UN agencies,
governments, labor, NGOs, and other companies to adopt and implement ten principles
of corporate social responsibility, the first two of which deal with human rights:
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Principle 1
Businesses should support and respect the protection of internationally
proclaimed human rights within their sphere of influence.
Principle 2
Businesses should ensure that their own operations are not complicit in
human rights abuses. 183
B. Development of the Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations and
Other Business Enterprises with Regard to Human Rights
¶64

But even before the announcement of the Global Compact, in 1997 the UN SubCommission on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights commissioned a study on
the issue of transnational corporations and human rights, which resulted in the
establishment of the Working Group on the Working Methods and Activities of
Transnational Corporations in the following year. 184 This Group was tasked with a threeyear study of the “‘working methods and activities of transnational corporations,’” which
culminated in March 2001 in a seminar organized by the Office of the UN High
Commissioner for Human Rights, attended by NGOs, representatives of corporations and
unions, scholars, and members of the Working Group. 185 The Working Group had not yet
completed its mandate, so its work was extended for three more years in August 2001. 186
This renewed mandate included authority to draft norms. 187 The Working Group
presented a draft of the norms in 2002, and met with NGOs in March 2003, incorporating
their suggestions and those of the larger Sub-Commission into the draft that they
ultimately submitted to the Sub-Commission later that year for approval. 188 The SubCommission deliberated on the Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational
Corporations and Other Business Enterprises with Regard to Human Rights and approved
them on August 13, 2003. 189
¶65
In April 2004, the larger Human Rights Commission commissioned the High
Commissioner on Human Rights to prepare a report “setting out the scope and legal
status of all existing initiatives and standards on business responsibilities with regard to
human rights, including the UN Norms for Business,” the results of which were presented
at the Commission’s 61st session one year later. 190 The 2005 Report of the United
Nations High Commissioner on Human Rights on the Responsibilities of Transnational
Corporations and Related Business Enterprises with Regard to Human Rights (the 2005
Report) incorporates the involvement and input of a wide array of stakeholders in the
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process regarding existing initiatives and standards governing transnational corporations
and human rights, their scope and legal status, and other issues of concern. 191
¶66
The presentation of the 2005 Report culminated in the appointment of Professor
John Ruggie as Special Representative for huma n rights and transnational corporations
and other business enterprises, pursuant to United Nations Commission for Human
Rights resolution 2005/69. 192 Ruggie, one of the primary architects of the Global
Compact and most recently the Special Adviser to the Secretary-General on the Global
Compact, is tasked with “identifying and clarifying standards of corporate responsibility
and accountability with regard to human rights”, and is expected to produce an interim
report for the 62nd session of the Human Rights Commission in 2006 and a final report in
2007.193
C. Defining Characteristics of the Norms
¶67

The Norms, already being tested by a group of leading businesses called the
Business Leaders Initiative on Human Rights, 194 are distinctive from past efforts in
several important respects and represent the first attempt by the UN to define an
enforceable, mandatory framework for corporate responsibility expressly for human
rights. 195
¶68
Perhaps the most striking and important aspect of the Norms is the expansive,
comprehensive nature of the rights that are encompassed. According to Amnesty
International, “[t]he Norms are the most comprehensive statement of standards and rules
relevant to companies in relation to human rights,” superceding individual companies’
codes of conduct, industry-wide standards, and even other international organizations’
guidelines (like the OECD, the ILO, and the Global Compact), which have typically been
much more general. 196 The incorporated rights include: non-discrimination; protection of
civilians and laws of war; use of security forces; workers’ rights; corruption, consumer
protection, and human rights; economic, social, and cultural rights; human rights and the
environment; and indigenous people’s rights. 197
¶69
The second distinguishing characteristic of the Norms is that they may be
considered the central repository for the most thorough and stringent expectations of
corporations with regard to human rights. 198 Not only do the Norms provide a singular
platform from which all businesses should operate, but they also refer to each of the
191
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various international human rights instruments deemed to govern their behavior,
providing “a stronger and more widely accepted basis of human rights responsibility
generally, and a jus cogens basis regarding some human rights.”199 Additionally, the
Norms detail positive, as well as negative, obligations. That is, corporations are not only
expected to refrain from activities that could infringe human rights, they also have an
affirmative duty to promote human rights in the world. 200 These detailed standards,
enhanced expectations, and points of reference provide a roadmap for businesses to
comply with the Norms.
¶70
The greater expectations for corporate responsibility bespeak a need for enhanced
enforcement mechanisms, which the Norms also anticipate. 201 These enhanced
mechanisms are particularly unique in the realm of corporate social responsibility.
Rather than a merely voluntary experiment, the Norms intend to be fully nonvoluntary,
and enforceable via a variety of mechanisms, from the businesses themselves to
international intergovernmental organizations, the United Nations, state governments,
NGOs, labor unions, trade associations, and the individual consumer or investor. 202 In
particular, companies are expected to adopt and enforce their own internal rules in
keeping with the Norms. 203 Additionally, the Norms indicate that businesses will be
subjected to periodic audit and review processes. 204 They also incorporate a requirement
of reparations to those harmed, reflecting a true intent toward accountability. 205
¶71
These unique characteristics of the Norms demonstrate a new level of commitment
by the UN to shift from soft, normative guidelines to “hard law” - an actionable,
enforceable mechanism for monitoring and enforcing corporations’ commitments to
human rights. As such, the UN is embarking upon uncharted territory with regard to
truly imposing social responsibility on transnational corporations, and other
methodologies that have done this somewhat successfully, like the Kimberley Process,
should be consulted to discern best practices and improvement opportunities. Several
hypotheses for lessons from the Kimberley Process to the Norms are articulated here for
further exploration and research.
V. INSTRUCTIVE ELEMENTS FROM THE KIMBERLEY PROCESS TO THE UN’S EFFORTS 206
A. Positive Qualities
¶72

An important advantage of the Kimberley Process has been the involvement, from
the outset, of key stakeholders as owners of the process. Not only has this allowed the
Kimberley Process to leverage the relative strengths of each constituency, but it has also
ensured legitimacy and buy- in to the certification scheme and system of warranties by the
199
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participant states and companies. Further, the process itself is likely more practicable
because it was devised by the very groups who it governs. Accordingly, in the Norms
effort, the UN must attempt to actively engage not a select few of the stakeholders, but
the entire transnational business and NGO communities and all of the UN member
states. 207 Admittedly, this is a lofty goal, compounded by the fact that the UN may have
difficulty recreating the same organic upwelling of support that can be derived from
activism on a single issue like conflict diamonds. Nonetheless, functioning with the goal
of maximizing stakeholder participation will likely allow the UN to more quickly reach
critical mass of each of these stakeholder groups such that the process will gain
legitimacy in the eyes of all it will ultimately govern.
¶73
Additionally, because this undertaking is so significant and unprecedented, it will
be imperative to have the direct involvement of those the Norms will govern in
determining their structure, that they may be an enforceable and functional instrument.
And buy-in and commitment from key stakeholders will also be an important means of
mitigating the inevitable weariness that can lead to distraction and abandonment of the
process, the beginnings of which are now being observed in the Kimberley Process.
¶74
Along the lines of gaining legitimacy and buy- in from key stakeholders, the UN
has held unprecedented meetings. In March 2004, the UN convened the first ever
meeting of national stock exchanges with corporate social responsibility experts, attended
by heads and senior officials from Deutsche Borse, Nasdaq, Canada, Italy, Istanbul,
Jakarta, Shanghai, and Brazil. 208 Earlier that year, the UN had hosted a similar meeting
with financial analysts from 40 leading companies, including BNP Paribas, UBS, and
Goldman Sachs. 209 Additionally, while the Norms are an important evolution of the
Global Compact, the compact has not been abandoned, and the first Global Compact
Leaders Summit was held in June 2004, at which politicians, corporate, and civic leaders
convened. 210 And perhaps most impressive is the long and diverse list of key
stakeholders who were invited to participate in the 2005 Report and ultimately did so. 211
The hope would be that the UN can engage this entire constituency in proactive pursuit
and implementation of the Norms going forward. Between tapping into its existing pool
of committed participants in the Global Compact and reaching out to these new
constituencies who would inevitably be impacted by the Norms, the UN is on its way to
building a winning coalition of key stakeholders.
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B. Improvement Opportunities

¶75

But two key issues plague both the Kimberley Process and the Norms:
voluntariness of internal controls and insufficiency of enforcement mechanisms. While
the Norms represent a significant evolution from the purely voluntary credos of years
past like the Global Compact, they nonetheless do not yet go far enough to be a truly
enforceable instrument. This is perhaps best demonstrated by the issues that the
Kimberley Process has encountered with regard to voluntariness and self- governance.
1. Voluntary Internal Controls

¶76

Just as the Kimberley Process anticipates that national governments will take it
upon themselves to enact implementing legislation and create internal controls to enforce
both the KPCS and the system of warranties, the Norms seem to presume that states will
establish the requisite legal framework to enforce corporations’ compliance with human
rights standards. 212 With regard to the responsibility of states to enforce the many
obligations delineated for corporations, the Norms simply state “States should establish
and reinforce the necessary legal and administrative framework for ensuring that the
norms and other relevant national and international laws are implemented by
transnational corporations and other business enterprises.”213 But just as the Kimberley
Process’s statements that each participant should “establish a system of internal controls
designed to eliminate the presence of conflict diamonds from shipments of rough
diamonds imported into and exported from its territory,”214 and “as required, amend or
enact appropriate laws or regulations to implement and enforce the Certification Scheme
and to maintain dissuasive and proportional penalties for transgressions,”215 proved
insufficient to force truly actionable legislation and controls, even among participant
states that made significant efforts, such broad and vague terms are simply insufficient.
¶77
In fact, while imprecise, the Kimberley Process guidelines are actually more
refined than those in the Norms, particularly in light of the broad scope that the Norms
will encompass compared to the relatively finite scope of the Kimberley Process.
Because it must address so much, this larger scope makes it that much more difficult to
draft specific wording providing explicit guidelines for the creation and passage of
implementing legislation. Also, the Norms are in an earlier stage of development than
the Kimberley Process, so their language is understandably unrefined. Nonetheless, a
vital aspect of their evolution from mere recommendations to enforceable, hard law will
be making this language much more specific, comprehensive, and direct.
¶78
Remarkably, the very same recommendations that emerged from the Global
Witness/Amnesty International study of the internal controls of eight nations in the
Kimberley Process could be equally instructive here: 1) mandate random, independent
government audits and inspections of corporate human rights policies and enforcement
thereof; 2) require companies to develop internal management schemes that ensure that
self-regulation is operating effectively and perform random reviews of company audits
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for accuracy and completeness; and 3) introduce a legally binding protocol to support
systems of self- regulation. 216
2. Monitoring/Enforcement Mechanism
¶79

Equally vital to the effective implementation of either instrument is a functional
enforcement mechanism. At present, while the Norms express recognition of the
importance of a viable enforcement mechanism through discussion of various possible
monitoring and verification schemes, no single scheme is designated and fully developed.
In fact, the Sub-Commission’s commentary asks that other UN bodies “‘develop
additional techniques for implementing and monitoring these Norms.’” 217 Accordingly,
were the Norms adopted today in their present state and an attempt made to implement
them, true enforcement would be virtually impossible. 218
¶80
Here again, the experiences of the Kimberley Process can be uniquely informative.
Recognizing the destabilizing impact of a failed enforcement mechanism, NGOs
constantly lobbied for the strictest possible monitoring vehicle the diverse Kimberley
Process could support. While NGOs are still unhappy with its current incarnation, the
monitoring mechanism did prove somewhat successful in the 2004 expulsion of the
Republic of Congo for its failure to meet the minimum standards of the process. The
existing Kimberley Process monitoring mechanism may not itself be a model to be
implemented by the UN to enforce the Norms, but the process by which it was devised,
with constant, unrelenting pressure from NGOs and a return to the issue over several
years, is demonstrative of a similar effort that parties to the Norms will likely have to
undertake.
VI. CONCLUSION
¶81

Certainly, there are significant differences that exist between the Kimberley
Process and the UN’s broader effort to define norms governing corporate responsibility
for human rights. Perhaps the most obvious of these is their scope and scale. The
Kimberley Process was devised to address a very specific human rights issue, while the
Norms seek to define a system of standards and an enforcement mechanism that could be
used universally with regard to any corporation’s acts that may impinge upon human
rights.
¶82
Hence, perhaps the best approach for the UN is to codify the successful aspects and
improvement opportunities of a process like the Kimberley Process – one that will
mandate, facilitate, and legitimize early on a system by which the impacted industries and
governments devise a way to police themselves, while ensuring that the control and selfpolicing mechanisms are buttressed by the force of the United Nations as oversight body
so that self- governance has follow-through. Perhaps there is even a mutually beneficial
middle road by which the United Nations provides the underlying principles and
216
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framework for corporate social responsibility; individual industry/issue groups, like those
centered on conflict diamonds, flesh out those principles into actionable tactics unique to
their needs; and ultimate accountability rests with an independent, back-end monitoring
mechanism that leverages the existing capabilities of the United Nations.
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